Opinion about Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict
By David Darchiashvili,
Director, Open Society – Georgia Foundation
This article was originally published in the Georgian daily 24 Hours on January 13, 2005.
The author presents an outline of the conflict settlement concept that was first elaborated in autumn 2003, at the Schlaining Center for Peace Studies (Austria), in cooperation with Tinatin Khidasheli [of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association]. The article is based on a number of theoretical provisions, as well as the previous research on Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts.
Civil Georgia re-publishes the article from 24 Hours daily, as it captures well one distinct stream of opinion regarding Abkhazia conflict settlement. The text has been abridged at places, without impacting on ideas presented by the author, to better fit the format of internet publication.
For settling the conflict as fully as possible, devising a desirable model of Georgian-Abkhazian political and legal unity, should be accompanied by elaboration and implementation of the confidence-building strategy. Otherwise, even the most post-modernist model of our future cohabitation, will either become empty words or will be perceived as a trap by the other [Abkhaz] side. Perceptions of the other [Abkhaz] side should become a central target of our strategy, since public visions and stereotypes are no less decisive than mercantile interests of private groups in the conflict.
Of course some might say that we [Georgians] have our own truth. They might say, why does not anyone think about the perceptions of ordinary Georgians and of internally displaced persons regarding the reasons and dynamics of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict? In order to settle the conflict, we of course should think about the problems and wishes of the Georgian society. It is also legitimate to calculate international or geopolitical combinations, to find a way through the labyrinth of positions and interests of regional players.
However, the most important problem is that a) until now we have only focused on our own truth and b) we have [previously] seen the way out of this conflict only in winning the hearts and minds of either Moscow or, sometimes, Washington, which meant neglecting the Abkhazians themselves.
These components of the Georgian-Abkhazian equation have their place and justification. But they will not bring any results, if more attention is not paid to the other participant of the conflict [the Abkhaz side]. Moreover, enjoying hearing only our own truth and searching for the conflict resolution keys in the capitals of other countries has brought no results so far.
The universal idea of peaceful conflict resolution is in admitting one’s own mistakes and recognizing the legitimate interests of the opponent. Only in this case one can expect reciprocity. Other methods will take us nowhere. We will simply waste our time.
We should also focus on one more essential circumstance in the Georgian-Abkhazian problem. According to the widespread view a “good cop – bad cop” position is justified if we want to push the other side into cooperation. In this particular case, this scenario works as follows: a part of the [Gerogian] authorities and the non-governmental sector will claim that peace has no alternative, while another part of the government, mainly from defense and security structures, will take care of sowing fear [among the Abkhaz] – not only thourhg their mere existence, but also by specific statements made by their representatives.
However, in ethnic conflicts the other side is not and cannot be viewed as a criminal suspect under investigation. In such conflicts fear never breeds love, as confirmed by contemporary history of the Balkans or the Middle East. Moreover, in such conflicts power is relative, “the weak side” has counting opportunities for multiplying its own power.
The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict has an ethnic character. It is a result of confrontation of the two, differing national projects. The rest – the third force or financial/criminal interests of specific groups – are only aggravating circumstances and not a key reason of the disease. In order to recover from this disease or achieve progress in the conflict resolution process, we should focus on the key reasons of this conflict.
Conflict Assessment
Conflict assessment is a necessary component for settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian relations. The ongoing assessments are constantly made by public figures and politicians. The Georgian officials have made statements, reports, and requests, which were submitted to the international organizations and governments of the leading states. The Parliament has adopted the resolutions; however the contents [of these documents] do not consider the interests of the other [Abkhaz] side, which is necessary to for conflict settlement.
The assessment, which should have an official status, needs to be academically grounded. On the other hand, it should be based on political expediency. It is possible to harmonize these two components. The political expediency should rely on the deep knowledge of social and political processes. On the other hand, social science is not setting any universal, unchangeable rules. It is also influenced by the given stage of social and political development. Accordingly, conflict assessment should not claim to revealing absolute truth. But it should be adequate to current academic knowledge about conflicts and ethnic societies, as well as to the political task of peaceful settlement of conflicts.
So, the assessment should [in my opinion] include the following:
The predecessors of the modern Georgians and Abkhazians lived side-by-side for centuries or millenniums, before the modern notions of national sovereignty came into play. Sometimes, they [the Georgians and the Abkhaz] were the parts of a united feudal monarchy, with the the Georgian and Abkhazian aristocrats creating a common caste. In other cases both ethnic groups fell under influence of the third force – either together or separately. Thus , the periods of unity within own [shared] feudal state or under the foreign empires were followed by separation, suspension of communications, ethnically colored feudal-clan clashes. As a result, when the European ideology of nationalism was adjusted to the sub-stratum of the Abkhaz ethnic self-consciousness, the formula proposed by Ilia Chavchavadze [Georgian intellectual in late 19th centaury, has proposed the formula “Language, Land, Religion” as defining factors of the Georgian unity] did not appeal to each and every Abkhazian to a similar extent.
The role that Russia’s 19th century colonial policy played in distancing the Georgians and the Abkhaz is more a sphere of historical and sociological interest, rather than the factor for establishing a modern policy of reconciliation.
One thing is quite clear: if a part of Abkhazian aristocracy was directly linked with the Georgian world by the social class or intellectual links, others were not. In the ethnically diverse region, where the border line between the Abkhazian and Megrelian [ethnic Georgian tribe] population was constantly shifting, the Abkhaz or Megrelian self-identification of the given family was a result of particular circumstances, rather than of purely ethnic origin. The drama played in many other parts of the world was re-played here: relying on the different languages and different interpretation of the historical events, two national projects were born.
The Megrelian population felt itself as a part of united Georgian state, while the “Abkhazianness” has become a basis of the different national project. Social class factor also definitely influenced further development of the Georgian-Abkhaz relationship during the [1917 socialist] revolution. Many Abkhazians linked the class issue to the national one; as a result eventually they alienated from the ‘Georgianized’ part of the Abkhaz aristocracy and found themselves closer to Bolshevism.
As a result, primarily in 1917-1921, and then during the Soviet period, political ideals of the Georgians and the Abkhaz – now the proper[ly emancipated] modern ethic nations – have radically separated from each other. The daily life and traditions remained very close, however, this is not enough for the political unity.
Therefore, notwithstanding the reasons for the Soviet repressions in the 1930s or mass migration [of the ethnic Georgians] from western Georgia to Abkhazia, the Abkhazians perceived it in the national[ist] context and defined it as Georgian imperialism. Frankly speaking, for many Georgians, the alteration of the demographic balance in Abkhazia represented a proper national objective. For the generation of our fathers and grandfathers, this was perceived as historical justice. But it is beyond doubt, that the Abkhaz society, carrying its own national ideas perceived everything in a different light.
Under conditions of the Soviet imperialism, ethnic nationalism was rather peculiar, perhaps even latent. First of all, it was expressed in formation of so called ethnocracies – ethnically homogenous local bureaucracies and “art intelligentsia”. These very people formed the new ruling class, and played a leading role in the affair of national unification – similar to the medieval aristocracy or clergy.
Did the personal and clan interests stand behind this role? Was it caused by the aim to attract the Soviet Union’s funds or struggle for power? Of course. But, to a great extent, Georgian and Abkhazian ethnocrats and intelligentsia competed with each other for the national ideals, rather than for material gain. In my opinion, this is main explanation for one member of the Young Communist League of Soviet Georgia Sergey Bagapsh to become one of the soldiers of Abkhaz national idea, while his elder colleague Zhiuli Shartava [killed in Sokhumi in 1993] – of the Georgian one.
Disintegration of the Soviet Union and the new national[ist] movements have only made this long nationalistic dispute between the Georgian and Abkhaz elites public. The liberal-democratic stream, which accompanies any national movement, failed to moderate this struggle and the worst-case scenario was played out. When the confrontation reaches its peak , the sides are not particularly distinguished by ethical choice of internal and external allies. Therefore, the 1992-1993 conflict turned into war of foreign agents, criminals and adventurers. However, it is worth noting, that the war, generally, cannot be ethical.
We [Georgians] became slaves to our own truth , we did not think about the Abkhaz truth. As a result, the chance for dialogue was lost. The sides focused on force. This has become the main reason for subsequent developments. We [Georgians] were defeated [in the war] and it is us who want to revise the current state of affairs. Therefore, we should take the initiative and recognize the egoistic aspects of our own nationalism and justified signs of the other side’s nationalism. Until now we behaved only the other way around.
If my analysis proves acceptable for the Georgian side, it would not be difficult to move from the conflict assessment to confidence-building. This very assessment, in fact, is a step towards this aim.
Recognizing the Legitimacy of Abkhazians’ Right to Self-Determination
Political expediency, modern research into conflicts and analysis of the Georgian-Abkhazian social history makes us state that it is senseless to investigate the Georgian roots of Abkhazian family names and vice versa. Formation of an ethnos, especially a modern ethnic nation, is a result of a collective will and the clearness of this will does not depend on etymological accuracies. It so happened, that an essential part of the Abkhazian population, whose origniation on Abkhazian land is beyond doubt, perceives itself as a part of national unity distinctly different from that of the the Georgians. And Abkhazia is the only native land for these peoople. Abkhazians’ self-perception as a nation naturally leads to demands of the political rights. This is not an ugly trick of any foreign conspirator [as some Georgians may like to think], but is a logic of nationalism, as a political or even more, sociological phenomenon. Condemnation of nationalism will yield no results – this ideology will remain as a dominant paradigm of modern world, along with the idea of democracy. This is quite obvious from the international political processes, and from the opinions of the modern historians, sociologists or political scientists.
Of course, nationalism does not always result in xenophobia, or in demands for full independence of this or that nation. But to destroy the ‘perception of enemy’ in the Georgian-Abkhazian relations and open the door to the alternative of Abkhazia’s full independence, we should recognize that any demands for Abkhazians’ self-determination are logical, and the Abkhaz national idea is legitimate. We [Georgians] should not only stop saying that the Abkhazian elite is an agent or puppet in the hands of external forces, but we should forget about this flawed idea forever.
Only after the Abkhazians are sure that we understand the logic and legality of their main, national-political aspiration, we can expect them to understand,why Abkhazia’s full independence and suspension of Georgian-Abkhazian political ties is so painful for us.
What kind of counter-arguments should we offer? Of course, reference to the international law is still relevant, but not sufficient for building trust. We should articulate our basic anxieties, in which values and ideals play at least as important a role as the material, humanitarian and legal arguments. This will be clear for the society with the similar concerns [the Abkhaz], whom we are only pushing into a defensive position by appealing to the international principle of inviolability of intenational borders. Until they [the Abkhaz] do not understand our national romanticism, any referrals to the UN or OSCE resolutions are considered by the Abkhazians as a conspiracy of Georgians, bent on occupation of their land. As a result, the Abkhazians become even more linked to Russia, which is the only alternative they have, and which does not serve neither Georgian nor Abkhazian interests.
Our additional argument is historical. Moreover, it is the issue of belief. It is difficult to verify its objectivity, just as it is difficult to validate the objectivity of Abkhazian version of history. However, nobody checks the relative weight of faith and values in the conflict. It is enough to see that people are ready to die for the collective values and beliefs. Hence, this argument is no less important in the Georgian-Abkhaz relations, than the norms of international law and a cascade of constitutional-political changes that occurred in our country during the XX century. Shortly speaking, our historical, value-based argument is as follows:
An ordinary Georgian believes in own national idea. This idea ties the mythological past to a particular territory. This territory also includes Abkhazia, because our modern national identity is shaped not only from antique Kartli [East-Georgian kingdom], but also from Egrisi-Lazika [West-Georgian kingdoms on Black Sea coast]. Moreover, Abkhazian kings have significantly contributed to formation of united Georgia. Because of the participation and consent of the Abkhazian’s ancestors, “Abkhazia” was at times a term identical to “Georgia”. The scriptures and literature of the Georgian state of middle ages belongs to the Abkhaz just as much as it belongs to Georgians. We cannot forget it, since it means that we forget about our Kings David and Tamar [great medieval kings of Georgia, credited with strengthening and developing a unified Georgian kingdom in 12-13 centuries]. By the way, these two names have no less emotional value for the Abkhazians – in Abkhaz narrations, these two kings, associated with the Golden Age, are represented as the prototypes of their kings – “Apskhs.”
As a result, a historical Abkhazian becomes a predecessor of a modern “collective” Georgian, while historical Abkhazia – is his native land. Here is the key for sharedness of our identity and historical space. However, these roots of our modern identity should not make us conclude, that modern Abkhazians are not right, when they demand independence. This is their will. But it should be clear for them that for “us” [Georgians] Abkhazia means more than just a picturesque Black Sea shoreline of Gagra.
I think if we understand the frankness of Abkhaz national idea, we should expect the same response towards our idea. Of course, there would be no miracle. Understanding of Georgians’ self-identification will not make them reject aspirations for independence. But if the Abkhazians’ fear recedes, I think it is quite realistic to launch a Georgian-Abkhazian dialogue over the new form of unity.
War was the Mistake
In order to break the image of a Georgian enemy in the Abkhazian’s consciousness, we should condemn the military operation launched by the Georgian authorities on the territory of Abkhazia in August 1992. It was more than a crime – it was a mistake. High crime rate or provocations [against Georgian authorities] can not justify the decision of the Georgian authorities to bring the tanks into Sokhumi. If we had thought through the ethnic and historic roots of this conflict already then, maybe we would have avoided yielding to our ambitions. The illusions for unifying the divided Georgian society [between the supporters and opponents of the exiled president Zviad Gamsakhurdia] through creating image of enemy out of Abkhazians [could have been avoided].
Then, the Georgians living in Abkhazia would have avoided a choice of either taking up arms, or being labeled as betrayers of the “Georgian deed.” Nobody can say, that the Abkhazians did not make the same mistakes of being partial or closed, but at this point we need to explain our mistakes, so that to make an effort towards reconciliation.
Following the escalation of violence, which threw thousands of people in the so-called “ecology of war” , the conflicting sides naturally focused on their own truth and demonized the opponent. At least for some tome, any dialogue about common past and future became unimaginable. The sides had only one feeling – vengeance. Only criminal world and Russia’s revanchist circles profited from this situation.
We can have a dispute over what might have happened if it were not for August 1992. Would Georgians and Abkhazians have found a common language? Or maybe clashes between the Georgian and Abkhaz factions of the local Supreme Council were anyway unavoidable? This kind of considerations is less important for the conflict resolution. The most important is that we should reveal our share of responsibility in the pre-war developments in the Abkhaz Parliament [which was split along the ethnic lines, as Georgian MPs walked out] or in the Sokhumi University [which was also split along the ethnic lines]. [In these events], egoism, incapability to listen to another side and probably, personal profit were as visible as legitimate demands.
But this is a topic beyond our discussion. In order to build trust, we should say: Shevardnadze’s government is responsible not only to the Georgian but also to the Abkhazian society for the blood that was shed.
Even Considering the Use of Force is a Mistake
If we are sincere in recognition of the Abkhazians as compatriots, it is not only pragmatically counterproductive to use the language of threats with them, but it is also unethical to do so. This does not mean that we agree on Abkhazia’s independence. This also does not mean that if mass repressions take place in Abkhazia and we, the rest of Georgia, reach consolidation of democracy, we should watch the developments passively. This basically means two things: the first, development of the army in Georgia already speaks for itself and it is not necessary to stress that the country is capable to defend its own interests. Moreover, constant talk about existence of “alternative”, meaning non-peaceful method of reintegration cannot foster reconciliation. And the second: we can think about the legitimate methods of protecting legal rights of our citizens in the critical conditions, but we have no right to overthrow the leader elected and supported by the Abkhazians. The only way towards reconciliation lies through the talks with this leader. If it is impossible to talk to the leadership or they refuse, then we should launch a dialogue directly with the Abkhaz society, in order to make their leader change his mind or search for the new leaders.
If we believe that Russia seeks to satisfy its own ambitions and geopolitical visions in Abkhazia, instead of pursuing peacekeeping policy, we should understand that by threatening the Abkhazians, we will only help Russia to achieve its goals.
The Georgian authorities should declare that the country’s military or police forces should have only one mission regarding Abkhazia: they will try to avoid mass repressions if they take place some day. As for the return and status of tens of thousands of internally displaced persons, this issue should be solved through the negotiations.
We like to say that if the talks come to a standstill, use of force will be unavoidable. But what does a standstill mean? If this means unconditional refusal of the Abkhaz side to any talks, ignoring the needs of Georgian or non-Georgian IDPs, then the statements over the necessity of humanitarian interference are quite justified. But, as far as I know, the Abkhazian side is ready for talks. It understands that the IDPs’ interests should be taken into account. Simply it [the Abkhaz side] has different goals, as well as different forms of taking into account the interests of the displaced population. So, we should speak only about peaceful means of conflict resolution, which has no alternative today. I believe, that along with other, political or economic issues, the issue of humanitarian or moral rehabilitation of the victims of war can also be solved.
Otherwise, we will continue to look at each other through the gun sight. In this case, it will be impossible to build trust, which is a precondition for the conflict resolution.
Specific Political and Structural Steps for the Transition Period
Along with the evaluation [of the conflict], making conceptual and moral steps as described above, we should offer proposals for cohabitation and stabilization of relations before the final settlement. If the understanding on the transitional period is reached this itself is a confidence-building measure, and makes it possible to discuss a model or models of full-scale settlement. Thus, we should elaborate the transitional structures and rules, which will define the Georgian-Abkhazian relationship before the establishment of the united State.
One more goal of these transition structures and rules should be decreasing of influence of a foreign country on the participants of the conflict. If we agree today over a bilateral format of cooperation, the ill-wishers will find it rather difficult to hamper our cooperation.
1. We should offer the Abkhazians an alternative to Russian passports. A passport for them is not only the means of finding a job in Russia, but also is a vehicle for communicating with the rest of the world. For an ordinary Abkhazian, obtaining a Georgian passport is equal to betrayal [of his nation]. Hence, we should offer them a special international document, which will temporarily replace the national passport and enable the Abkhazians to learn more about the world, the achievements of modern civilization, to obtain first-hand information about the prospects of European integration and see alternatives to Russia. This is the way to convince the Abkhazians that the Georgian-Abkhazian integration can be mutually beneficial, since it is a bridge, which connects with Europe. Rapprochement with Europe is also a guarantee that the Georgians will not use their numerical advantage for eradicating the Abkhazian identity.
Development and distribution of such international travel documents requires consent of the relevant international organizations. But if the conflicting sides give their approval, the rest is just a technical issue.
2. We should offer the Abkhazians full economic cooperation. This means trade, restoration of communications, banking relations, etc. This issue is already discussed by the authorities. But it is not so important, what material profit the Georgian authorities will offer the Abkhazian population from this or that economic project. The issues of legal status and management of these projects are more essential. Otherwise, the Abkhazian side will perceive economic privileges as a proposal for selling off their own national position and this will yield no results.
For clear reasons, we cannot recognize Abkhazia’s independence and accordingly, our economic relations cannot look like inter-state ties. Until the talks over the status [of Abkhazia] start, we should think over transitional, joint Georgian-Abkhazian management and decision-making structures. This can be a specialized Georgian-Abkhazian Council, which will have a discretionary right to making decisions independently regarding those issues which are equally related to economic well-being of both Georgians and Abkhazians.
3. The most important and painful issue is the rights of the internally displaced persons. We should depoliticize this issue as much as possible. In particular, rehabilitation of IDPs’ property and rights should not be perceived as the mean for changing demographic balance in Abkhazia under political pretext. We should not declare that economic cooperation will not be established until the IDPs return to their native homes. Such statements were made many times previously, however yielded no results. I think, if the ice of mistrust is to start melting, promoted by legalization of economic cooperation, the rehabilitation of refugees’ rights would become more realistic. But, at the same time, from the very beginning we should ask the other side to respect the norms of international law, and accordingly to recognize that the Abkhazian de facto authorities will respect IDPs’ vital interests and assume its share of responsibility for their realization.
The issue of IDPs should belong to a category of legal and humanitarian aspects and a special organization should be set up on the parity basis in order to solve IDP-related problems. On the one hand, it is necessary to launch a commission, which will define the legal parameters of solution of the IDPs issue. On the other hand, it is important to create a mechanism for implementation of decisions – a special body should be set up. This body may have a status of joint Georgian-Abkhazian Agency, with relevant funding and enforcement levers. This body may also have law enforcement units.
One more essential problem, related to defending IDPs’ interests, is their future status and accordingly the issue of their security. The problem of security cannot be settled quickly and completely. However, if we agree over the above-mentioned joint agency, we may make progress in the security-related problems more rapidly.
As for the status, as known, the Abkhazian side urges the returned IDPs to be loyal to the Sokhumi authorities and agree on Abkhazian citizenship. Up to present, this condition was unacceptable both for the Georgian authorities and for most of the displaced persons. Here, we also need a compromise: until the conflicting sides achieve final settlement of the conflict, we may consider the following requirements:
a) Those displaced persons, who are ready to accept Abkhazian citizenship, should enjoy full rights to their own national identity. At the initial stage, this should envisage ensuring of civil and political freedoms, particularly, the possibility to study in Georgian and creating the national communities, as well as reserving the right to Georgian citizenship. Gradually, the Abkhazian side should provide access to legal proceedings in the Georgian language. These should be the principled position of the Georgian side;
b) Those displaced persons who do not wish to obtain Abkhazian citizenship and are waiting for final resolution of the conflict should also have a chance to return to their native homes. Naturally, such persons will be obliged to observe the laws which are in force in Abkhazia, but this does not mean that they should be forced to openly display loyalty to the Abkhazian state. A legal status of such persons should be similar to a status of a resident without citizenship. This person should also enjoy all basic civil rights. The only difference is that such person will have no right to participate in local elections.
But, this process may be protracted in time and will be realized only after making specific progress in confidence-building . Today most important is to elaborate proposals over cooperation in the issues of the status and security of those Georgians, who have already returned in the Gali district of Abkhazia. We should talk about the models of joint administration and joint law enforcement. Until final settlement of the conflict, we should not talk about either Georgian or Sokhumi’s absolute sovereignty. We should create the demilitarized zones with transitional bilateral or international administration. We can also take a temporary measure: Gali district is administered by persons appointed from Sokhumi. Simultaneously, a local representative council is functioning under the bilateral or multilateral agreement, instead of the Abkhazian constitution.
4. One more painful issue regards investigation of war crimes and punishment of those responsible for these crimes. The Abkhazians used to push this issue constantly. At the same time, the Georgian side also has numerous examples of war crimes by the Abkhazians. It is necessary to set up a special, international commission, which will study each separate case. It will take into account the international humanitarian law, as well as the terrible ecology of ethnic, essentially civil war, which makes people lose their human character. The relatives of victims cannot be asked to forgive the guilty. But this commission should try to ascertain the truth, rather than to become a punitive body. The sides should agree that those persons, who deliberately commit crimes against peaceful population, should be subjected to severe punishment.
Generally, settlement of conflicts does not mean total restoration of legality. It is essentially impossible after the war. We should achieve internal purification – sincere admission and condemnation of offences. Persecution of each individual criminal, when mass patriotic slogans are behind the crime, is quite unrealistic. It is not by chance that in many countries, in order to reach reconciliation and settle ethnic, religious or racial conflicts, criminal offenders are amnestied, if the crime is politically motivated. The process of reconciliation of the participants of our civil war [in early 90s] can be brought as an example.
The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict was a tragedy both for the Abkhaz nation and entire Georgia. Basically, we understand tragedy, as the loss of our territories. However, it is more tragic that our nation, while moving from totalitarian regime to democratic system, failed to find inner force to settle this conflict peacefully. Yes, we were punished, but not because we wanted independence from Russian imperialism, but because of our overweening ambition. If we want to avoid similar situation in the future, as well as to avoid worse tragedies both at personal or national levels, the only way out lies within Georgian-Abkhazian federalism.
The Abkhazians proved by their ethnic history that they have this right and we should agree. This does not mean that this [federal] model should be extended to entire Georgia. Simply, this is an optimal way out of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The Abkhazians have no other native land. We, the Georgians and the Abkhazians have a common native land. But if they wish their own, legitimate contribution to sovereignty that proceeds from their historic inheritance, like our wishes proceed from our history, we should agree. In reality, the Abkhazians do not want federalism either. But the Georgian side cannot offer more. If the trust is restored between the conflicting sides, I think, both sides would agree to this compromise.