Armenian-Russian Relations: ‘Strategic Partnership’ or Too Close for Comfort?

By Richard Giragosian, Reposted from RFE/RL 31 July 2002

The strategic relationship between Armenia and Russia has significantly deepened in recent months, leading to concern over the parity of the relationship and some trepidation over Armenia’s mounting dependence on its larger partner. Armenia is the only country in the Transcaucasus to openly welcome a Russian military presence on its territory, and its leaders seem increasingly determined to anchor their small state ever more firmly within the Russian orbit.

Although such a strong relationship with Russia is vital for Armenia, its implications for Armenian national security appear to be little-considered, and certainly little-debated, beyond the small circle of Armenia’s ruling elite.

The latest example of this trend is the recent “assets-for-debts” agreement, whereby Russia forgives some $98 million in Armenian debt in exchange for control of at least four of
Armenia’s relatively few strategic enterprises.

Although still subject to parliamentary ratification by both countries, passage of the long-delayed agreement seems assured. Orchestrated by powerful Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisian in his capacity as co-chair of the Armenian-Russian intergovernmental commission, the deal is reportedly targeting the Hrazdan thermal-power station, the “Mars” electronics company, and two Yerevan research institutes for transfer to Russian ownership.

While some welcomed the “assets-for-debt” deal as a means to garner important new investment into some of the country’s most promising enterprises, others, including the political opposition,
criticize it as a case of excessive generosity by the Armenian government in exchange for little more than the write-off of paper debts by Moscow at a time when Russia herself is securing debt
forgiveness from the West.

Such criticism is, however, largely irrelevant insofar as the deal was the brainchild of Sarkisian, whose real behind-the-scenes power is unrivaled. A rare example of a powerful minister surviving the transition from a previous presidency, Sarkisian is Moscow’s man in Yerevan, and as such is an effective counterweight to Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian’s
multipolar foreign policy of “complementarity.”

Aside from this outward example of the deepening of ties between Yerevan and Moscow, there is a more serious, and potentially harmful, aspect to the Armenian-Russian relationship that remains obscured by the overriding focus on Russia’s security guarantee for Armenia. It is the political aspect of the Armenian-Russian relationship that presets a particularly understated threat to the development of democracy and the rule of law in Armenia.

That threat stems from the Armenian leadership’s espousal of the Russian model for power and governance. In what could be termed “good governance gone bad,” Armenian President Robert Kocharian is now drawing on some of the more dubious practices current in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, practices that pose a threat to Armenia’s infant democratic institutions.

The Russian political model offers specific tactical and strategic lessons for the less experienced Armenian president, including precedents for restraining an independent media, marginalizing the opposition, subverting the rule of law, and keeping the parliament powerless and ineffective. This Russian model of a strong authoritarian presidency, free of effective “checks and
balances” or oversight, appeals to most of the post-Soviet Armenian political elite. The lessons from Putin’s moves against the opposition and independent media also have not gone unheeded in Armenia, just as attempts at meaningful constitutional reforms remain relatively symbolic and incomplete.

The real threat to Armenian democracy is most clearly demonstrated by the tendency toward individual strong leaders, rather than an institutionalized strong leadership, and the related
preference, shared by both the present leadership and the opposition, for personality over performance. The opposition, hitherto a fractured collection of over a dozen disparate political parties, is now single-mindedly seeking one candidate capable of opposing Kocharian in the coming presidential election. But finding one candidate acceptable to all is the hardest challenge in these negotiations and has also encouraged talk of a return to power by former President Levon Ter-Petrosian, despite his tainted record of corruption and political repression.

Thus, the opposition is limited by its shortsighted focus on personality over platform. Former Prime Minister and twice-defeated presidential candidate Vazgen Manukian’s recent exhortation that “we should rally around ideas, rather than candidates” has seemingly found little resonance.

In what some may argue is a natural feature of the post-Soviet transition period, Armenia shares the Russian preference for the “strong hand” of an authoritarian leader, whose firm rule,
some contend, is a necessary prerequisite for painful economic reforms. This also helps to explain such manifestations of Kocharian’s disdain for the democratic process as his recent decree empowering the police to use force if necessary to remove unruly deputies from the chamber for “disrupting” parliamentary sessions.

It is also reflected in the parliament’s recent reversal of the December 2000 electoral reforms, reducing the number of deputies elected by proportional representation. That return to the status quo ante was backed by only one party — the pro-government Republican Party (HHK) led by Prime Minister Andranik Markarian.

It is this apparent determination to use every available means to cling to power that casts doubt on the democratic credentials of the Armenian president and worries those concerned for the course of democracy in Armenia.

Richard Giragosian is a frequent commentator on developments in the Caucasus and writes the monthly publication “Transcaucasus: A Chronology.”