Regional Political Games Create Risks for the OSCE Role
After a long silence that followed the presidential meeting between Eduard Shevardnadze and Vladimir Putin in Chisinau, Russian media has recently resumed its claims regarding the plans of the Chechen militants to infiltrate Russia from Georgia.
This time the accusations seemed even more groundless, as high snows have already blocked the mountain passes. However, recent attempts at pressure may pursue more far-fetched goals.
In the past, reports of the OSCE observers on Russo-Georgian border have been the most effective tool in the hands of the Georgian government to counter accusations of Russia’s defense officials.
OSCE observer mission was opened in December 1999. Later, in 2001 in response to continued reports on violation of the border from the Russian side, the Georgian government extension of the mission to the 58 kilometers of the Ingush portion of the border. The OSCE observers are unarmed. Georgian side takes full responsibility for their safety and security.
During the time of its presence, information offered by the monitors helped to defuse tensions between the neighboring countries, which escalated into mutual accusation on armed violations of the border. While Russia has claimed that Chechen guerrillas maintain a fallback position in Georgia’s Pankisi gorge, Georgia quoted repeated violations of its airspace.
More importantly, the OSCE observers have officially confirmed a fact of violation of the Georgian airspace by unidentified craft flying from the north on August 23, 2002. Georgian border guards do not possess the equipment to record such violations. While the OSCE observers also lack the radar devices, their visual observation was sufficient to trigger the international reaction, which forced Russia to back down from its aggressive stance.
Recently, a shy rapprochement between Georgia and Russia allowed for better communication between the border guards and the security services. Georgia has also showed its willingness to crack down on terrorist suspects, extraditing five Chechen detainees to Russia and performing security checks on Chechen refugees.
Nevertheless, Russian diplomats consistently criticized OSCE activities and attempted to reach withdrawal of the monitoring mission. Analysts argue, that sole presence of the international observers so close to Chechnya is a sufficient irritant to the Putin administration, which attempts to seal of the area of the conflict from the international scrutiny.
Several months ago the Georgian Foreign Ministry has requested OSCE to include Dagestan part of the borderline in monitoring as well, thus covering almost full length of the Georgian-Russian border. However, recently the sources close to Georgia’s foreign establishment told Civil Georgia that the pressure was high on OSCE to limit number of its observers in Georgia, officially because of the worsened security conditions near the border.
It seems however, that the diplomatic effort of Russia went in vain. The OSCE Spokesperson in Georgia Volker Jacoby told Civil Georgia “the border monitoring mission will be expanded”. Jacoby confirmed that “on December 19, the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna decided unanimously with the vote of the Russian
delegation. to increase the number of observers from 75 (42 in winter) to 144 (111 in winter)”.
Russian Embassy in Tbilisi declined to comment on activities of the OSCE observer mission and possible inclusion of the Dagestan part of the borderline into their monitoring mandate.
While presence of the OSCE monitors is the most proximate source of irritation for Russia, the most painful aspect for the Kremlin is the decision, adopted at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, which obliges Russia to withdraw its military bases from Georgia.
Russia has already closed down its base in Vaziani (near Tbilisi). Russia also claims closure of the Gudauta base in breakaway Abkhazia; however, it proved so far impossible to internationally verify the fact of the closure. Some Georgian sources claim that the military and the equipment of the base were simply put under the banner of the peacekeepers, deployed in Abkhazia under CIS mandate.
Currently, the Georgian and Russian sides negotiate withdrawal of the two remaining bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi. Dates for their withdrawal were not set during the Istanbul summit, and the sides are bogged down in a lengthy discussion. Russia keeps arguing that it would need 11 years to close down these bases, while the Georgian side says three years are sufficient.
Last week Russians made a sweet-and-sour surprise both for Georgia and the OSCE. On December 12 Russian and Georgian experts failed to agree on terms of withdrawal of the Akhalkalaki and Batumi bases. However, they have to withdraw a small communications unit of the Russian troops, located near Tbilisi. Already on December 16, matching the visit of the Azerbaijan Defense Minister Safar Abiev to Tbilisi, the unit was withdrawn to Giumri base, in Armenia.
Military expert Irakli Aladashvili says the communication unit, consisting of 193 soldiers serviced the Group of Russian Armed Forces in Transcaucasus (GRAFT) [headquarters in Tbilisi] with satellite and special communication. Thus, Aladashvili believes, “it would be logical if in the wake of removal of this unit the GRAFT will be moved in Armenia as well.”
While Georgian side can be nothing but content by the Russian withdrawal, moving of the units to Armenia causes extreme suspicion of the Azeri leadership and backfires both at Georgia and OSCE.
Safar Abiev protested already in Tbilisi: “Russians are moving their units to Armenia while the Karabakh conflict is far from its resolution. With such actions, Russia is making Armenia a source of tension, which might be directed against Armenia’s neighbor countries.”
The US officials have also responded to the transfer of the unit Armenia. The US ambassador to Azerbaijan Ross Wilson stated “withdrawing bases to Russia would be acceptable for every concerned party”.
Russian side claims removal of the unit was done in “fulfillment of obligations before OSCE.” However, when asked whether the issue was coordinated with OSCE Volker Jakoby told Civil Georgia “we are discussing the issue in Vienna at present. [Removal of the unit] is a part of 1999 Istanbul Agreement, but now we are negotiating whether the military equipment will be moved to Armenia as well.”
While the goal of OSCE is to contribute to the conflict resolution and build the regional security, Political games in the South Caucasus, orchestrated by Russia, expose the organization to the accusations in political partiality. Under these circumstances, if Georgia’s inconstant and contradictory policy regarding Chechen issue can make OSCE’s political risk exposure too high to allow for continued presence of the monitoring mission.
If this happens, Georgia would be left without its only internationally backed argument against possible recurring threats from the Russian military.
By Revaz Bakhtadze