Mikheil Saakashvili plans to address the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) on January 26 to present the new and comprehensive plan for the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflict resolution. Georgian president told the reporters on January 17, that PACE was selected as “the most appropriate venue” for voicing the Georgian proposals. Nonetheless, Saakashvili recently brushed aside the Council of Europe (CoE) criticisms for his administration in what increasingly becomes a bitter-sweet interaction.
“Now, somebody gives us recommendations – parliamentarians of certain organizations – and this is good, but it is for us to make the decision. Similar recommendations were sent to the Baltic States or Turkey[for a long time] but these countries are normal countries. [To give these recommendations extremely high significance] is a sign that some politicians in our country are deeply backwards provincials,” such was the reaction of Saakashvili to the opposition statements that the new government lost support of the only European organization it is a part of – the CoE.
President referred to the PACE draft recommendation issued late in December 2004. On a positive side, the document acknowledged the “unyielding resolve” of Georgia’s government “to carry out far-reaching political, legal, social and economic reforms.” More notably it deferred fulfillment of the Georgian commitments made before the accession to the CoE, which includes highly politically sensitive and logistically complicated return of Meskhetian Turks to Georgia’s southern, Armenian-populated districts.
On the other side, however, the recommendation leveled strong criticisms against Saakashvili administration stating “the post-revolutionary situation should not become an alibi for hasty decisions and neglect for democratic and human rights standards.”
Specifically, the draft recommendations call on Georgia to revise the Constitutional changes adopted in February 2004, which according to CoE’s Venice Commission conclusion, grant excessive powers to the President. The Venice Commission said the changes were intended to transform the strong presidential model into semi-presidential one; however, some of them went beyond the democratically accepted system where President acts as a mediator and arbiter between the strong prime-minister and strong parliament. February changes to the constitution, the Commission argued, has diminished the role of the parliament vis-à-vis the executive, and entrusted the President with powers to keep the Cabinet in which the parliament has no confidence.
In yet another conclusion, the Venice Commission has criticized the Law on Status of Adjara Autonomous Republic, saying it excessively restricts the autonomy and minimizes the role of the local legislature.
Saakashvili’s reaction at CoE recommendation is somewhat harsh for the person who says he aspires for EU membership and displays EU flags at the government buildings. This reaction has two main components.
One part is irritation: in curious similarity with the US position, Saakashvili sees the Europeans as too soft, unable to understand the degree of real challenges the Georgian government is facing. In spring 2004, he called then CoE Secretary General Walter Schwimmer, a “well-paid bureaucrat not interested in people” for treating Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze and Georgian authorities as co-equal sides in a political dispute and thus ignoring what Saakashvili thought was a clear position of the Adjarian people against Abashidze
On the other hand, Saakashvili plays purely face-saving game, trying to present possible compromise as his own decision, and not the one taken under opposition pressure. The CoE charges on Constitutional changes and Adjara law are the hardest to accept for Saakashvili, especially as they were vocally voiced by his current opposition – some political parties and majority of NGOs – during the discussion of the draft legislation, even before the Venice Commission conclusions came through
Overturning the Constitutional changes has political consequences, as they reflected the precarious power balance between the “Revolutionary Triad” – Saakashvili, Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and Speaker Nino Burjanadze. Some of the CoE proposals – such as the one calling to transfer the right for appointing the provincial governors from the President to the Prime Minister – may well trigger the rift between Saakashvili and his own allies from the National Movement.
As for Adjara, excessively restrictive law was certainly influenced by the bad experience with Aslan Abashidze, who, based on gaps in legislation, essentially carved for himself a fiefdom in Adjara during Eduard Shevardnadze’s presidency.
Overall though, the CoE recommendations are not unacceptable for the current Georgian administration. Some of them, including curbing of torture in the detention facilities and reform of the prosecution are well in line with Saakashvili’s declared policies. The CoE gave a deadline of September 2005 for most of the changes to take place. Until then, Saakashvili may himself decide to revise some of the Constitutional provisions, depending on how the political interaction within the administration would proceed.
“I am sure that government fully understands the seriousness of this document [CoE recommendations,” says one of the most prominent critics of the February 2004 Constitutional amendments, legal expert David Usupashvili, “thus for me, it is less important whether the government would admit [to its mistakes] publicly. The main thing is [for them] to take the criticisms into account and consider them in a complex task of state-building.”
In the meantime, Saakashvili hopes to overshadow the CoE recommendation with his peace proposals. But his real performance on CoE recommendations by September 2005 would largely determine how realistic Georgia’s EU aspirations are.