Burjanadze in Opposition? Why not
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| Nino Burjanadze feels left out by the allies. |
During the run-up for the November 2, 2003 elections society expected, and indeed called for, the opposition unity, capable of overtaking President Eduard Shevardnadze’s unpopular rule. There and then, the opposition failed to unite. Only in extreme conditions, as the street pro-tests raged Zhvania and Burjanadze have joined forces with their colleague Mikheil Saakashvili who made a decision to confront Shevardnadze in a much tougher way than moderate ‘Burjanadze-Democrats’ bloc would advocate for.
A ‘revolutionary triad’ was not a marriage made in heavens, but a marriage of convenience.
Zurab Zhvania was the champion of opposition unity. His United Democrats were moderately popular, but not commanding a voter base that would give even slight chances of the majority in the parliament. On the other side, moderate Zhvania, with a capacity to talk to all sides in a political game could only win if the opposition coalition had materialized.
Political maverick Saakashvili was mastering a radical protest vote before November 2. An alliance with former Zviadists and anti-Abashidze Republican Party, spiced up with his energetic personality made him confident he could win alone.
Nino Burjanadze, pro-opposition head of the parliament, saw her personal popularity rise, commanding much-aspired provincial votes – previously Shevardnadze’s domain. Thus she became an offer no opposition party could resist. However, being late to shape her own team, Burjanadze had to accept someone else’s game. An alliance with Zhvania’s moderate party left both sides content: Burjanadze got an organizational structure to rely on, while Zhvania received a popular figurehead thus making his team more electable.
But the Revolution of Roses has changed things. Burjanadze’s brief interim presidency did not subtract from her popularity, but with the opposition is already in power, she is no longer indispensable.
Zhvania got what he wanted – his prime-ministerial ambitions were well known, and observers argue this role suits him much better than the position of a party leader. Hence, Zhvania is prone to agree, and even strongly support merger of his technocratic United Democrats with Saakashvili’s National Movement.
Saakashvili-the-President has moved away from radical rhetoric in an understandable, and welcome, bid to be more statesmanlike. This move to the political centre brings him much closer to the United Democrats and away from some of his pre-revolution allies – such as the Republican Party. The Republicans want to maintain their party identity. For now, their leader David Berdzenishvili feels his political bid for being the leader of Adjara outweighs his antipathy towards Zhvania. But as his objectives are met and as the time goes by, Republicans will maintain only loose coalition with the alliance of United Democrats and the National movement.
Which leads us to an important point: how is the Georgian political system going to function beyond March 28? National and international observers are worried there’d be no opposition in the parliament. But one has to admit, lowering of the electoral barrier to let the current opposition into the parliament is more like putting them on life-support gear when the brain is already dead.
The alliance of the New Rights and the Industrialists (Rightist Alternative) is logical. Popular Gogi Topadze of the Industrialists would add much needed spice to somewhat stale New Rights, whose strong field network should allow them to make it into the parliament. A reckless course of the Labor leader Shalva Natelashvili is likely to leave him out of the game, leaving a gap on the left.
But those whose attention-span dates back beyond November 23, 2003 should remember that there were objective, ideological and tactical differences between the political powers that now compose the winning revolutionary coalition. That is why, a long-term political observer Ia Antadze remarks that the main opposition is likely to come from within the group that led, and won, the revolution.
This is not a bad thing. A false unity of the political leaders leads to political stagnation and puts the voter in disadvantage. Remember the CUG – one may have wanted to vote for Zhvania, but not for the Shevardnadze old guard (or vice versa). But as their party stood – at least technically- united, it was up to the in-party intrigue to decide who emerged on top, not for the voters. This should not be repeated. The ruling coalition that assumes the power, and responsibility, after March 28 should be as coherent as possible.
Nino Burjanadze is not content that her favorites did not make it onto a voting list to the extent she would have liked to. Her emotional reaction is understandable – she feels left out by the allies. This should yield to more pragmatic approach if she wants to survive on the political arena.
Burjanadze has the full right to demand what is duly hers – backing of the National-Democratic alliance on the position of the Parliamentary Chairperson. But she should make it clear that she would go ahead composing her own team, which may, or may not enter the ruling coalition.
A political split between the President and the Prime Minister is dangerous and can destabilize the country. Both men made their own choices and tied their fates together – at least for the immediate future. It is their unity that the public expects.
But Nino Burjanadze should feel that her hands are not tied by previous arrangements with Zhvania. If she has the ideological differences with the current leadership, she should form the new team and express these ideas openly. Her voter base is, largely, intact.
The current leadership is guaranteed to make sharp moves on anti-corruption and economic reform. Burjanadze can reach out to the generation currently in their 40s as well as to the provincial voters and play a stabilizing role in a political life. But for once, she should try to make the first move if she wants to stay on the stage. And, if we take public opinion into account, stay she must.