South Ossetia: Activism of the Georgian Government Tests International Efforts

Reposted from Central Asia – Caucasus Analyst

Breakaway region needs a complex of social and economic rehabilitation projects.

The Georgian government has taken decisive steps to address some of the most pressing political and economic problems related to the post-conflict area of South Ossetia and proposes revision of the current peacekeeping mandate.

Recent developments in South Ossetia have shown the inadequacy of the current peacekeeping arrangements to the complex state-building and conflict resolution tasks that the new Georgian administration pursues. Pro-active economic rehabilitation and social assistance programs that are offered to South Ossetian residents hold promise for boosting the political negotiations, but also a risk for a militant backlash.

Somewhat paradoxically, the international organizations involved in conflict resolution could prove the least ready to catch up with the new developments. 

Background: The conflict in South Ossetia, leading to the death of ca. 1,000 and the displacement of some 60,000 persons ended in a ceasefire in July 1992. A somewhat unorthodox ceasefire arrangement introduced a joint peacekeeping force (JPKF) composed of Georgian, South Ossetian and Russian elements.

Russia took the factual, as well as the legal lead of the military operation. The OSCE has been the most actively involved international institution in the political aspect of conflict settlement, but a quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) involving Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia as well as Russia’s North Ossetia Republic became the main political discussion forum. The OSCE acts as a JCC participant, while UNHCR and EU involvement in the process has varied over times and is by now rudimentary.

Although the OSCE drafted a settlement proposal in August 1994, Russian mediation (with OSCE participation) proved more fruitful in moving the political dialogue forward. Meetings between the South Ossetian and Georgian presidents Lyudvig Chibirov and Eduard Shevardnadze in 1996-98 led to a general détente in the conflict area.

By the end of the 1990s, road communications between Tskhinvali and neighboring Georgian provinces were restored, and the region became a booming hub for largely illegal trade between Georgia and Russia.

While economic détente was apparent, a political settlement proved evasive. In July 2000, the conflicting parties agreed through OSCE mediation on demilitarization, joint economic projects, elaboration of the legislative base for repatriation of displaced persons, and even on joint law enforcement activities.

Yet hopes for eventual political settlement were dashed in December 2001 with the election of Eduard Kokoev as South Ossetia’s president. Kokoev, a Russian businessman, has reportedly monopolized the illegal trade and squeezed the previous leadership out of the political arena, accusing them of pro-Georgian sentiments. Kokoev also presided over a massive acceptance of Russian citizenship by South Ossetian residents.

South Ossetia became a tangible economic security threat to Georgia. Goods smuggled via Ossetia, such as petrol and flour, reportedly capture up to 30% of the Georgian market. The “war economy” in South Ossetia has also involved the Georgian and South Ossetian law enforcers, as well as the peacekeepers, in smuggling and corruption.

In late May 2004, President Mikheil Saakashvili ordered interior troops to crack down on smuggling. These moves harmed the interests of the South Ossetian political elite, and apparently upset the Russian peacekeeping commander, resulting in a standoff between Georgian special services and the Russian and South Ossetian peacekeepers.

In addition to these measures, Saakashvili proposed a complex of social and economic rehabilitation projects in South Ossetia, pledging to extend the Georgian government’s protection to its Ossetian citizens. For the first time, the Georgian leadership took the initiative in South Ossetia and made some reconciliatory moves, albeit carefully backed by credible force.

The reaction of foreign players has been rather perplexed. Russia has reacted with warnings to Georgia against a resumption of hostilities. The OSCE has made no official reaction apart from expressing general concern. However, State Minister for Conflict Resolution Giorgi Khaindrava has indicated that the Georgian government will propose a revision of the peacekeeping mandate in South Ossetia.

Implications: Georgia’s economic concerns are real. However, it is impossible to effectively address these concerns in the current format of peacekeeping, and OSCE diplomats seem to grudgingly agree that the current format, which concentrated on the separation of warring forces, has outlived its usefulness.

Effective anti-smuggling operations by Georgia put a stranglehold on the South Ossetian leadership and may push them towards militarism if political solutions are lagging. The domination of the Russian and Ossetian components in the JPKF also seems to end as Georgia brings its peacekeeping battalion to full strength in personnel and equipment, and concentrates well-trained troops and heavy equipment in adjacent Georgian provinces.

The need for a new level of political mediation is urgent, but international actors seem hesitant to take risks and accept that function. The OSCE has the longest history in handling this particular conflict. However, its political decision-making is burdened by consensus voting in Vienna, which would render the organization incapable in case of Russia’s opposition.

OSCE-Russia interaction failed to produce results in 2003, when a Transdniestria peace plan strongly influenced by Russian interests was met with opposition in Western capitals and eventually failed, spurring heated criticisms towards the OSCE, which the organization may see as an obstacle in addressing South Ossetia.

The EU has crucial tools at its disposal that may come into play if initial political consultations on South Ossetia are successful. The EU has generated significant experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina by running the police mission (EUPM) tasked with reconciliation and synchronization of the hostile ethnic groups within a single police force and also rendered significant assistance to improvement of the border controls there.

In South Ossetia, the interoperability of local police with Georgian counterparts would be crucial in ensuring joint anti-smuggling efforts and precluding an armed standoff similar to that of May 31, 2004.

South Ossetia has historically been overshadowed by the conflicts in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The interest and involvement of the international organizations and foreign powers, except Russia, has been very weak.

However, at present the Georgian government is determined to first “unfreeze” and then resolve the conflict, and is choosing a long-term, economics-based approach coupled with a “hearts and minds” campaign to achieve this goal. Together with a relatively low degree of inter-community tension, South Ossetia has the chance of becoming a one-of-a-kind conflict resolution success in the post-Soviet space and likely set a precedent.

There is a fierce battle among international organizations for political know-how, donor attention and finite funding. The organization or state that puts stakes in South Ossetia conflict resolution is likely to rip significant political benefits, while the consequences of failure are unlikely to be catastrophic.

Conclusions: Current actions of the Georgian government to articulate new policies towards South Ossetia provide a good background for productive political mediation by third parties. The international organizations present in the South Caucasus such as the OSCE and the EU have comparative advantages to take up this role. Georgia’s recent détente with Russia allows for positively involving the Kremlin in this process.

It would take decades to amass the political will for peaceful resolution comparable to the current mood in Tbilisi. Unless the international organizations overcome their lethargy towards the relatively low profile of South Ossetia to see the region-wide benefits of successful conflict resolution, promising developments may go in vain, leaving the scene to the “parties of war” on both sides of the conflict.