Russia’s Guarded Watchfulness

Russia is aware of pro-Western stance of Georgia’s new leaders.

Premature regime change in Georgia presents a policy challenge to Russia. Highly visible political stunts of Vladimir Putin’s administration do little to conceal their general confusion. But it seems Russia’s only choice now is to watch and wait.

Russia’s ambiguity towards Eduard Shevardnadze has helped the opposition to force embattled president out of office.

Many in Russia, including the powerful military and security establishments hold a grudge against the Soviet foreign minister to has, in their eyes, squandered the geopolitical assets of the superpower. In Georgia, Shevardnadze opened the way to the US military presence in his country to the resentment of the Russian political elite.

However, Shevardnadze’s political weakness and corruption of his government have allowed Russia to come back from the seemingly losing situation. Acquisition of Tbilisi energy distribution network by RAO Unified Energy Systems and Gazprom’s take-over of the gas infrastructure reinforced Russia’s strategic position in the country and South Caucasus vis-a-vis the United States. 

Paradoxically, this political success of Russia may have contributed to Shevardnadze’s demise. The opposition used the opportunity for slamming the president. On the other hand, the western countries, and the United States have developed the ‘Shevardnadze fatigue’ due to his mood swings and unexpected changes of position on core issues.

Today Shevardnadze speaks of almost the US conspiracy to depose him carried out by the ’embassies of some countries’ and George Soros. But the case is likely much simpler: it was not that the foreign powers consciously undermined Shevardnadze, but simply nobody stood up to his defense, thinking his departure would simplify, rather than complicate the situation in the long run.

Russia was not on top of these events. Irrespective of what the conspiracy theorists and geopolitical gurus in Georgia and Russia must say, its Southern neighbor was not very high on Putin administration’s agenda. At least not high enough to look deeply into country’s social developments that have mobilized the civil momentum that proved sufficient for Shevardnadze’s demise.

Ivanov’s emergency visit was likely to have two more aspects. On one side it was a PR stunt: Foreign Minister showed his country was on top of things and has scored some points with the Georgian opposition. Zurab Zhvania, in his November 27 interview to the Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta has confirmed Ivanov was pressing for resolution of the crisis short of Shevardnadze’s resignation.

On the other hand, Ivanov came with the reconnaissance visit. Putin administration does not know the three opposition leaders well. There have been only passing visits of Zhvania and Burjanadze to Moscow in the capacity of parliamentary speakers. Ivanov’s task was to probe the degree of anti-Russian radicalism resident in the minds and actions of the three leaders.

Following Shevardnadze’s resignation, Putin administration tried to tread the middle way. Putin himself condemned the policies of the outgoing president speaking of the “series of systemic mistakes in its domestic, foreign and economic policies.” But Ivanov questioned the legitimacy of the interim government saying Shevardnadze’s decision to resign was taken “under heavy pressure, so it cannot be said that this decision was fully democratic.”

What Putin is aware of, is clearly pro-Western stance of all three leaders of the new government. The new Georgian president would start from the clean slate with Russia and will have the luxury of the first move in building these relations – at least in the short term. This may lead to more open and consistent commitment to the West.

As a result, Russia sees its new tool of expansion – economic interests – seriously threatened. If the new government would succeed to attract higher foreign investment by curbing corruption and increasing efficiency, Russia’s role and influence may consistently diminish.

It is also of Russia’s concern that the United States is likely to promote Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’ as an exemplary case of how greater democracy (civil society, media and opposition) act as a brake on corrupt and unpopular regimes. Russia fears, the pro-Western opposition forces in Moldova, Ukraine and Byelorussia may feel inspired to follow the suit. Loss of the European buffer zone to the US interests will be a painful geopolitical blow to Russia, so its short-term diplomatic effort will be directed at preventing the domino effect.

On the other hand, stronger and more predictable government in Georgia is in Russian security interest, as it should be capable of alleviating the security concerns over terrorist incursions from the South, as well as the fears of general instability in the South Caucasus.

It seems that so far, Russia adopts a watchful stance. The consultations of the three leaders of the Georgian trouble spots – Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adjara – are not likely to bring definitive results. They would, however allow Moscow to send a message to the interim government, that Georgia’s painful spots are still at Kremlin’s disposal. As things stand now, however, it is only Adjara that represents a serious headache for the new leadership. Abkhazia and South Ossetia do not play a decisive role in shaping Georgia’s internal politics any more.

Pragmatic vision has so far dominated Putin’s actions. Common pragmatism in the Georgian case would suggest not interfering while country’s leadership has massive popular support and rides the wave of excitement. The worst thing for Russia’s interests would be to present now an external threat to Georgia that would further consolidate the nation.

Simply speaking, Russia would count on the new leadership becoming overwhelmed with ongoing political and economic problems. Putin’s speech has outlined all the factors – corruption, foreign debt, collapsed economy – that may present insurmountable tasks for Georgia. If this happens, Russia would step in as a big brother, offering help to the leadership, which would return Georgia to pre-revolution foreign policy situation.

Adjara, negotiations on the Russian military bases, status of the Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia will be immediately the tactical decoys that will tie down the resources of the Georgian authorities, bringing attention of the public to its failures.

Despite Georgia pulling unexpected trick and endorsing pro-Western, pro-reform leadership, Russia still counts to consolidate its influence in the long run. It remains to be seen whether Russia would settle for the definition of positive-sum victory that will include strong and sustainable Georgian statehood.